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Abstract : The oil producing countries that have 
deliberately focused on the development of their oil 
and gas industry’s structures and enforcement of 
their legal and regulatory frameworks have usually 
been able to dramatically reduce associated gas 
(AG) flaring. However, this is not always the case 
in places where investment is difficult, oil projects 
are extremely remote or where the legal and 
regulatory framework are so defective to the extent 
that it could be manipulated by the oil companies 
or a seeming lack of political will on the part of the 
government, a classical example is Nigeria. 
Therefore, this paper compared Nigeria’s 
frameworks for combating gas flaring with that of 
Norway. It critically analysed the Nigeria’s 
legislative and regulatory efforts towards 
combating AG flaring and the key barriers that 
hinder Nigeria’s efforts to eliminate or achieve 
substantial reduction in AG flaring. It finally 
ironed out lessons for Nigeria based on the 
Norway’s effort towards combating gas flaring in 
its oil and gas sector. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Nigeria is the sixth largest oil producing nation and 
the second largest gas-flaring nation in the world 
after Russia.  It is estimated that about 20% - 40% 
of its AG production was flared in 2013; 
amounting to $2.5 million USD, thereby 
contributing 10% of the total global gas flared 
annually according to the World Banki. The 
unabated continued AG flaring in Nigeria has 
significant adverse environmental, socio-economic 
and health effects on the oil producing 
communitiesii. Successive Nigerian Governments 
have adopted the strict hard-line stance of 
prohibiting flaring by means of legislation while 
imposing penalties, fines and environmental 
taxation as a means of discouraging the practice.  
However, absence of effective and efficient legal 
and regulatory mechanisms for monitoring and 
enforcing compliance of the law had led to sub-
optimal outcomes in the Nigeria’s effort to combat 
AG flaring. On the other hand, ever since the 
beginning of hydrocarbon exploitation in Norway 
in 1971, the Norwegian government by law 
prohibited AG flaring  by demanding that oil 
companies could not sell crude oil from fields on 
the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS)  until they 
had found a way to dispose of the AG. This early 
legal prohibition significantly reduced Norway’s 
AG flaring. 
 
Consequently, the choice of Norway as a model is 
informed by several reasons among others include; 
firstly, Norway along with World Bank is the 
initiator of the voluntary global standards for 
combating gas flaring and currently, the only 
international voluntary initiative for combating AG 
flaringiii. Secondly, the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate is currently working closely with the 
Nigeria in assisting the country to combat AG 
flaring and has contributed its experience with the 
Norwegian system to the different projectsiv. 
Thirdly, Norway is generally highly regarded for 
the way in which it carries out its gas resource 
management and several developing countries have 
already gained experience or expressed an interest 
in learning from its system (E.g. Ghana)v. Lastly, it 
has successfully eliminated AG flaring from its 
petroleum activities, by banning it and ensuring a 
positive value of gas at the source through 
comprehensive resource management that is similar 
to the approach taken by Nigerian authorities, 
however, unlike Norway, AG flaring in Nigeria is 
still a subject of discussion. 
Therefore, this paper discussed in detail both 
country’s frameworks for combating gas 
flaring,  
 It compared Nigeria’s frameworks for combating 
gas flaring with that of Norway. It critically 
examined and analyses the Nigeria’s legislative and 
regulatory efforts towards combating AG flaring 
and finally ironed out lessons for Nigeria based on 
the Norway’s effort towards combating gas flaring 
in its oil and gas sector. 
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2 FRAMEWORK FOR 
COMBATING GAS 
FLARING IN NIGERIA 
 
2.1 Overview of the Oil and Gas 
Industry  
According to United States Energy Information 
Administration (US-EIA), Nigeria has an estimated 
37.062 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves 
as of December 2015 - equal to 2.2% of the world’s 
share that brings the country in the top tenvi. It also 
had an estimated 182 trillion cubic feet of proven 
natural gas reserves, which is equivalent to 2.7% of 
world’s gas reserves and this makes Nigeria the 
ninth largest deposit of natural gas in the world and 
the largest in Africavii. As Africa’s leading 
hydrocarbon producer, Nigeria accounted for 26% 
of African and 2.7% of total world crude oil 
production in 2012, where in the same year it 
accounted for 1.1% of global gas productionviii. 
The Nigeria’s oil and gas dominate the extractive 
sector and is the mainstay of the country’s 
economy; it was estimated to account for about 
14% of Nigeria’s real gross domestic product in 
2013ix. In 2012, the Nigeria’s oil and gas industry 
accounted for 96% of export revenue, a more than 
USD $100 billion of revenue to the government. 
The NNPC reported that, total crude oil production 
for the year 2013 was 800,488,102 barrels, giving a 
daily average of 2.19 mm/pad while a total of 
2,325.14 Billion Standard Cubic Feet (bscf) of 
Natural Gas production was reportedx.  
However, a substantial part of the production is 
being flared because of major factors that would be 
discussed later in this article. Even though 
petroleum activities in Nigeria started in 1908xi, the 
AG flaring began at the commencement of the 
production in 1956 where 95% of the total gas 
produced was flaredxii. At that time there was no 
any legal framework regulating AG flaring but  
was only covered in general under the Nigerian 
Constitution where it provides that; “The State 
shall protect and improve the environment and 
safeguard the water, air and land, forest and 
wildlife of Nigeria”xiii.  
 
2.2 Legal and Regulatory 
Frameworks  
The Nigerian authorities have passed various laws 
regulating the management of petroleum activities 
and safeguarding the environment. Examination of 
Nigerian legislation reveals many laws regulating 
the practice of flaring AG among these includes: 
2.2.1 The Petroleum Act 1969xiv 
This is the primary basis for laws and policies 
regulating AG flaring in Nigeria. The Act gives 
petroleum minister power to make regulations 
relating to licences and other matters to which 
issues relating to prevention of pollution to the 
atmosphere are included
xviii
xv and the Petroleum 
(Drilling and Production) Regulationxvi was 
made pursuant to the power. The Regulation 
required the oil companies to submit to the 
Minister any feasibility study, programme or 
proposals for the utilisation of the AG that has been 
discovered in their licensed area not later than five 
years after the commencement of the productionxvii. 
Although, the Regulation requires oil companies to 
submit their plans for AG utilisation, however, the 
provision was not seen as legally obligatory and 
contained no penalty for non-compliance .  
Moreover, there were also no measures to 
discourage flaring before or after the submission of 
the required feasibility study or programme for gas 
utilisation. Apparently, the Regulations merely 
required oil companies to submit a feasibility study 
or programme for gas utilisation and nothing more. 
Consequently, an oil company could engage in AG 
flaring prior or after submitting the required 
feasibility study or programme for gas utilisation 
without any penalty. Similarly, the wording of the 
Regulation that, “the Licensee or lessee of an Oil 
Mining License shall not later than five years after 
the commencement of production, submit to the 
Minister of Petroleum Resources, a feasibility 
study…” can be seen as an express permission of 
the oil companies to flares AG for a period of five 
years without any scrutinyxix.  
 
Therefore, the Regulation was “”not fit for 
purpose” as it was neither adhered to by the oil 
companies nor enforced by the Nigerian 
governmentxx.  In any event, the Act was inherently 
flawed as regard AG flaring and therefore, could be 
suggested that, from the start of the oil exploration 
until 1979, there was practically no legal 
framework for combating gas flaring in Nigeria. 
 
2.2.2 The Associated Gas Reinjection 
Actxxi and the Regulationxxii 
This is the first significant legal framework 
specifically for combating AG flaring in Nigeria 
laid down in 1979. The Act required the oil 
companies to prepare and submit to the minister 
programmes for AG utilisation or re-injectionxxiii 
and expressly prohibited AG flaring after 1st 
January 1984 unless in exceptional casesxxiv with a 
forfeiture of the concession/licence as a likely 
penalty for contravening the provisionxxv. These 
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goals proved to be unrealistic for reasons that 
include; the huge financial resources required for 
gas re-injection facilities, inability of the Nigerian 
government to meet its financial obligations under 
the various joint venture agreements and the 
insistence by the oil and gas companies of their 
inability to meet the deadlinexxvi.  
 
Therefore, where it became apparent to the 
government that, the oil companies were not able 
and ready to meet the deadline, the prohibition was 
relaxed. The Petroleum Minister in the exercise of 
his power under the Actxxvii
xxviii. The Regulation allowed 
oil companies to continue flaring of AG under 
permits issued by the minister
 established the 
Associated Gas Re-injection (Continued Flaring of 
Gas) Regulation 1984
xxix, but subject to 
payment of a penalty of two kobo (N0.02k) per 
1000 standard cubic feet (scf) of gas flared at any 
place where the permission to flare was not 
grantedxxx.  
 
However, it was observed that, the exemptions 
under the Regulations had the immediate effect of 
exempting a total of 86 out of 155 oil fields from 
anti-flaring provisions
xxxii. For 
instance, an oil company was quoted to have said 
that, “it was cheaper to flare gas, while gas flaring 
would cost the company only $1 million, the cost 
of switching from water to gas injection would cost 
$56 million”xxxiii. Therefore, following campaigns 
and pressures from environmental campaign 
groupsxxxiv, the Regulation was amended and the 
fine was increased to fifty Kobo (N0.50k) in 
xxxvi. In 
2009 also, the government established the National 
Domestic Gas Pricing and Supply regulations, 
which also increased AG flaring fines to $3.50 
USD for every 1000 scf of gas flaredxxxvii
xxxi, while, the remaining 
fields were subject to a fairly insignificant penalty 
that made it far more economical for the companies 
to flare the AG than to utilize or re-inject it
1990xxxv and was further increased to ten naira 
(N10.00) in 1998 for every 1000 scf flared
. 
However, oil companies prefer to pay the meager 
penalty that is comparatively cheaper than utilising 
the AG.  
Therefore, these sanctions appear not to have 
achieved its aim, in fact, the fines monetised AG 
flaring at a very cheap rate, and made it more 
economical for oil companies to flare AG rather 
than its utilisation or re-injection. Thus, despite the 
fact that the government adopted an economic 
approach to encourage AG flaring reduction, the 
approach failed to achieve the desired objectives.  
This state of affairs has continued to the present 
day as all efforts to end gas flaring has been 
without successxxxviii. 
2.2.3 The Petroleum Industry Bill, 
2012xxxix 
The recently proposed Bill has been another 
significant legislative effort by the Nigerian 
authorities to combat the menace of AG flaring and 
promote its utilisation. The bill seeks to consolidate 
all the existing oil and gas laws in the country into 
one piece of legislation in accordance with the 
principles of good governance, transparency and 
the sustainable development of Nigeria
xliii. The bill provides that, the oil 
companies must stop flaring of AG after the flare
xl.The key 
aspect of the Bill touching on AG flaring has been 
the Chapter Dxli  that addressed a wide range of 
issues. The Bill prohibits AG flaring, but provides 
certain exceptional situations, which permit may be 
grantedxlii. For instance, for safety reason, in cases 
of start-up, equipment failure shut down, or due to 
the inability of the gas customer to take-off 
delivery
-
out date, which is to be prescribed by the Minister 
in regulations to be made pursuant to the Actxliv. It 
declared that, any company that flares or vents AG 
without a permit from the Minister shall liable to 
pay a fine, which shall not be less than the value of 
the gas flaredxlv. It also makes AG flaring without a 
permit a criminal offencexlvi.   
In particular, the Bill imposes the requirement of a 
gas utilisation plan as a condition precedent for 
grant of an oil production lease or license in the 
Nigerian petroleum industry. It provides that; “a 
license or lease for the production of oil and gas in 
Nigeria shall not be granted to a company unless 
the application is accompanied by a comprehensive 
gas utilisation or re-injection programme which is 
acceptable to the Minister”xlvii. It also mandates all 
operators to install metering equipment within 
three months of the Act coming into force to 
measure the volume of gas flaredxlviii. However, all 
these legislative efforts shown were in vein, as the 
bill is still with the National Assemblies without 
any certainty as to its passage into law and that the 
date line of 31 December 2012 set by the Minister 
for stopping AG flaring has already been passed 
and the PIB has not yet adopted.  
 
Additionally, several other Bills were proposed 
between 2009/2010 for the prohibition of the 
flaring, which set up deadlines of 31 December 
2012xlix. Among the proposed Bills are, the Gas 
Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2010l, 
which provides for higher financial penalties and 
the possibility of shutting down oil fields that 
default. While, the Environmental Management 
Bill 2010 even went ahead to hold oil companies 
and the Directors criminally liable for not ending 
the AG flaring after the stated deadline and set a 
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minimum of 10 years imprisonment or fine of 
N500 million Naira on conviction. However, these 
Bills were certainly not passed into law up till now, 
while the federal executive’s preference for a 
longer deadline have scuttle efforts at progressive 
legislative changesli. 
 
2.3 Current Status 
According to World Bank report, Nigeria is second 
to Russia in global gas flaring, the country flared 
about 38% of its natural gas total production in 
2010, or about a one third of the gross natural gas 
produced in 2010lii, while the figures from the 
Nigerian government agency (NNPC) claimed that, 
only 24.30% was flared in the year. Similarly, the 
2013 figures from the same   department suggested 
that, the country flared only 409.31 bscf (about 
18% of its 2013 total production)liii a decreased of 
about 20% from that of the world Bank 2010 
report.  
 
Figure 1 - AG flared by production from 2010 – 2014(2014 represents the January – May period only) 
 
Even though, this figure shows a substantial 
decrease from that of 2010, however, it cannot be 
relied upon as being the most accurate figure due to 
the conflicting statement revealed by the DPR (a 
subsidiary of NNPC) within the same period. The 
DPR claimed that, “the country is still flaring about 
24% of its total production per day, worth an 
estimated $2.5 billion annually, due to lack of 
infrastructure to harness the associated gas”liv. The 
NNPC has at the same time also claimed that, 
flaring cost Nigeria N289.6 billion Naira 
(equivalent to USD $2.5 billion) per year in lost 
revenuelv. Moreover, recent investigation by the 
“Daily Independent” revealed that; ‘the oil majors, 
including their local counterparts, still flared about 
85 per cent associated gas, even as the National 
Assembly has yet to announce a shift in the date, 
thereby creating a legal loophole for flaring’lvi.  
 
The Nigerian Government had been trying to end 
gas flaring over the years with the flare out 
deadlines been repeatedly postponed. The most 
recent deadline had been December 2012
lviii. Recently, Nigeria issued statement 
permitting oil companies to flare substantial 
amount of the gas resources in the country until 
2020, which, according to the parties involved, is 
the feasible year for the flare out deadline
lvii. 
According to Professor Emeka Duruigbo “it was 
pathetic and horrible the gas still being flared in 
Nigeria. The deadline keeps on shifting. Like 
Russia, and each time they imposed standards, 
fines, deadlines, nothing seems to come out of 
it”
lix.  
 
The Nigerian government later in 1999 vigorously 
pursued the objectives of reducing AG flaring by 
encouraging accelerated gas development and 
utilisation projects through its pro- gas utilization 
fiscal incentives framework, rather than rely on gas 
flaring penalties and prescriptive approachlx. The 
MPR has established an accelerated gas 
development and utilisation programme, whereby 
the Ministry will give the AG to any third party 
company that is ready to invest in gas utilisation 
and monetisation projects just as the case in 
Norwaylxi. The Nigerian Government has directed 
more efforts at constructing a network of gas 
pipelines across the country in order to deliver 
flared gas to domestic markets and this has led to 
some reduction in AG flaringlxii. However, despite 
all efforts and rigorous frameworks for combating 
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AG flaring, Nigeria remains the second largest 
flaring country in the world.  
3 FRAMEWORKS FOR 
COMBATING AG FLARING IN 
NORWAY 
 
3.1 Overview of the Oil and Gas 
Industry 
The right to the petroleum resources on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) is vested in 
the Norwegian state. Petroleum activities in 
Norway began in 1960; just two years later than 
Nigeria and the first oil field came on stream in 
1971lxiii. Norway is one of the significant oil 
producers with offshore oil fields
lxvii
lxviii
 on the continental 
shelf. It is the largest holder of oil and natural gas 
reserves in Europe as it has provided much of the 
oil and natural gas consumed on the continentlxiv. In 
2013, Norway was the 3rd largest exporter of 
natural gas in the world after Russia and Qatar, and 
the 12th largest net exporter of oillxv. The 
petroleum activities have been crucial for Norway's 
financial growth and in financing the welfare state. 
Thus, petroleum activities have an enormous 
income potential, with crude oil, natural gas, and 
pipeline transport services accounted for 52% of 
Norway's exports revenues, 23% of gross domestic 
product (GDP), and 30% of government revenues 
in year 2013lxvi. Norway's oil production has almost 
doubled since 1990, increased six fold since 
1981  and peaked at 2001 with oil production of 
3.4 million barrels per day (bbl/d)  while natural 
gas production on the other hand, increased nearly 
every year since 1993lxix. Currently, there are 76 
fields in production and these fields produce 1.8 
million barrels of oil per day and 111 billion 
standard cubic metres of gaslxx.  
However, despite the huge increased in its oil and 
gas production, the AG flaring volumes as a 
percentage of oil production has decreased 
substantially over the last decades. The Norwegian 
authorities have always imposed strict 
environmental regulations on the petroleum 
activities; the legal measures for safeguarding 
environment were legislated well since the 
activities started on the NCS. For example, 
permanent AG flaring was prohibited by the 
parliament since 1971 under the parliamentary 
principles known as “10 Oil Commandments” 
which later formed the basis for the Norway’s 
current legal and regulatory framework. The No. 5 
principle provides that, “flaring of exploitable gas 
on the NCS must not be accepted except during 
brief periods of testing”lxxi. Later, Norway 
introduced petroleum Activities Act confirms the 
prohibition and carbon tax Act that made the 
industry players took a number of steps to reduce 
the AG flaring. 
 
3.2 Legal and Regulatory 
Framework  
The rule of law, and stable framework conditions 
including the timely honouring of commitments 
were the second nature to the Norwegian 
authorities since the inception of petroleum 
activities in the countrylxxii. Norway had a well
lxxiii, thus, the 
current legal framework for combating flaring in 
Norway is the The Petroleum Activities Act
lxxiv. This Act, is the primary and significant 
legislation regulating the practice of flaring in 
-
developed legal tradition for dealing with and 
compelling utilisation of the AG that may have 
been flared from its oil and gas industry. The full 
realisation of the AG utilisation was approached 
when the oil and gas activities started
 (PA 
Act)
Norway, it provides that: “Burning of petroleum in 
excess of the quantities needed for normal 
operational safety shall not be allowed unless 
approved by the Ministry”lxxv. However, upon 
application of the licensee, the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy is empowered by the Act to 
stipulate the quantity that may be produced, 
injected or cold vented for a fixed period. This 
section whilst recognizing the need to flare gas for 
operational needs takes a tough line against the 
unnecessary flaring in very precise and 
unambiguous language. 
 
Moreover, the Regulation made pursuant to the PA 
Act also makes it a condition precedent that, before 
any development of a discovery and/or operation of 
such discovered deposits, “a plan for installation 
and operation of the facility for transport has to be 
approved by the ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy”lxxvi. This requirement makes the rule 
against flaring an operational policy also, making 
it impossible to develop a field unless adequate 
provisions have been made for AG utilisation 
facilities. This provision treats AG utilisation as an 
integral part of oil development and thus, can be 
suggested as placing the state on the offensive 
rather than defensive in its efforts to combat AG 
flaring. 
 
3.3 Current Status  
 With this single legislation,  Norway has recorded 
a huge success in combating AG flaring in the last 
decades, AG flaring volumes as a percentage of oil 
production has decreased substantially while the 
production of crude oil within the same period has 
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almost increased by six foldslxxvii
lxxviii
. For instance, the 
total petroleum production for the first eight 
months in 2014 is about 183.7 million standard 
cubic meters (Sm3) of oil equivalents, while only 
0.09% of the total production was flared. The total 
oil production in 2013 was 191.7 million Sm3 of oil 
equivalent, while only 0.16% of the total 
production was flared. According to the IEA 2013 
report, there are many reasons for the success of 
Norway’s petroleum resource management and 
these include; “strong and competent regulation, 
prudence in health, safety and environmental 
issues, and a stable, fair and attractive fiscal 
framework” .   
 
Figure 2 - Norwegian AG Utilisation and Flaring by Total Production from 2010 – 2014 (Note: the 2014 
figure represents only eight months from January - August) 
Source: NPDlxxix 
The reduction in a flaring means reduction in GHG 
emissions and thus, petroleum operations from the 
NCS releases less CO2 emissions than any other 
sector in Norway and accordingly among the 
sources of emissions in the petroleum activities, 
AG flaring carries the minimal percentage of 
emissions. Furthermore, a recent study conducted 
on the sources of emissions on the NCS and other 
sector confirmed that, AG flaring tends to produce 
fewer emissions compared to other sector like 
roads and other industrieslxxx. 
 
Figure 3 - Total Emissions from Norwegian Industrial Activities from 2008 – 2013 (by 100%)lxxxi 
 
The success achieved by Norway can partly be 
attributed to its strong legal and regulatory 
framework for combating the practices and the 
strong political will on the part of the Norwegian 
authority to get rid of the menace. The stringent 
restrictions on flaring under the PA Act has led to 
technological development and triggered measures 
that have yielded considerable emission 
reductions and keep the general flaring level on the 
NCS low, compared with the rest of the worldlxxxii.  
4 ANALYSIS, LESSONS AND 
CONCLUSION 
It is now obvious from the preceding discussion, 
Nigeria and Norway have both utilises similar 
approach towards reducing the flaring of AGlxxxiii. 
At the same time also, both countries are 
experiencing a boom in oil and gas production and 
it has generally understood that increase in oil 
production is increasing the amount of flaring. 
However, while, Norway utilises almost all of its 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Total Production 2349 2136 2040 1917 1837
Total Utilised 2348.25 2135.56 2039.64 1916.84 1836.91
Total Flared 0.75 0.44 0.36 0.16 0.09
0
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production with flaring only 0.09% in 2013, in the 
same year, Nigeria flares major percentage of its 
production. According to the NNPC – DPR 
conflicting figures, almost 20%lxxxiv
lxxxv
 - 40% of the 
natural gas production was flared in 2013 . 
  
 
Figure 4 - Percentage of utilised and flared AG productions in Nigeria and Norway from 2010 - 2014 
 
 
The above figure shows that, despite an increase in 
oil production, Norway’s AG flaring volumes as a 
percentage of oil production have substantially 
decreased or suffice to say eliminated over the last 
5 years. Therefore, before arriving at any 
conclusions, some analysis and observations would 
be made based on their current legal and regulatory 
frameworks for combating AG flaring in order to 
highlight areas where Nigeria goes wrong and with 
hope; it can acquire some lessons from Norwegian 
experience. 
 
4.1  ANALYSIS 
The legal and regulatory framework for combating 
AG flaring must be clear, precise and 
unambiguous. Therefore, the key driving force 
behind the reduction in AG flaring in Norway has 
been the country’s efficient, clear and precise legal 
and regulatory framework for combating AG 
flaring. While, prohibiting AG flaring, the 
framework makes it virtually impossible for the oil 
companies to proceed with a field development 
until oil companies proffer solution to AG 
utilisation through submission of PDO/PIO that 
must be approved by the Norwegian 
authoritieslxxxvi. As part of the process also, the 
operator must submit EIA describing any 
environmental effects of expected emissions and 
discharges from AG flaring and includes a 
systematic review of costs and benefits of any 
mitigating measures. Similarly, the PDO/PIO and 
the actual EIA are subject to public consultation. 
Therefore, the strict restrictions on flaring imposed 
by the Norway’s PA Act contribute to keeping the 
general flaring level on the Norwegian shelf below 
one per cent.  
 
While the Nigerian government on the other hand 
has persistently enacting laws prohibiting flaring 
AG flaring, however, it provides relatively wide 
exemption to the contrary as discussed abovelxxxvii
lxxxviii
. 
The framework was inherently flawed as it failed to 
achieve its ultimate objectives. Thus, it may be 
argued also that, the problem is not the framework 
itself, rather the deficiencies and the loopholes in 
the framework. Apart from being unclear and not 
precise, the legislation has created a vacuum that 
oil companies use to manoeuvre and obtain permit 
by simply claiming that gas recovery is not feasible 
in particular field .  
4.2 LESSONS 
Therefore, there are many generic lessons from the 
Norwegian experience in combating the AG 
flaring, which, if learn and utilises by Nigeria may 
assist the country in reducing or suffice to say total 
elimination of AG flaring: 
I. The legislation governing petroleum 
operations and the contractual agreement 
between the host country and the oil 
companies should be clear, comprehensive 
and unambiguous on the treatment of AG. 
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II. The regulations for combating AG flaring 
should be clear, with effective monitoring, 
reporting and enforcement capacity. 
III. Setting flare out deadlines should be a 
cooperative approach in consultation with 
key stakeholders, particularly the 
operators.  
IV. New Licenses, Production Sharing 
Agreements and Joint Venture 
Agreements should include provision for 
AG utilisation: For instance, AG 
utilisation should be an integral part of the 
field development planning process.  
4.3 CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to examine and  analyse 
approaches Norway and Nigeria applied in 
combating AG flaring, studied how Norway’s 
approach contributed to the decrease or suffice to 
say total elimination of AG flaring and the lesson 
Nigeria should learn from Norway experience. It 
has been understood that, is the responsibility of 
every government of oil producing countries to set 
out a legal and regulatory framework governing 
environmental policy. As part of developing this 
framework, Norway has provided good framework 
that specifies the strategy and the measures to 
achieve overall environmental and resource 
management objectives. Norway is well in the 
forefront when it comes to using efficient legal and 
regulatory framework to provide environmental 
solutions, and the country has since utilises legal 
instruments and effect measures in its efforts to 
reduce AG flaring. The restraint on flaring under 
the PA Act contributes to keeping the flaring level 
on the Norwegian NCS low.  
Therefore, the conclusion that can be drawn based 
on the above analysis is that, despite its deficiency, 
Nigerian frameworks lacked punitive approach that 
can motivate oil companies to initiate gas 
utilisation projects. Hence, it can now be safely 
concluded that, the failure of the Nigerian 
government to combat the practice of AG flaring is 
the lack of both adequate and efficient legal and 
regulatory measures coupled with the lack of 
political will to do so. For strong political will 
presupposes that, Nigeria needs to make sure oil 
companies comply with the requirements set by the 
regulators, as well as taking necessary measures for 
expanding her gas export facilities beyond the 
volume the country currently exports.  
 
Consequently, Norway’s success in eliminating AG 
flaring can be credited to its sound legal and 
regulatory framework as well as the result of a 
collaborative process that is comprehensive and 
long lasting. Hence, apart from the above generic 
recommendations, the measures Nigeria should 
now specifically focus and establish are, an 
efficient legal and regulatory framework, 
independent regulatory body, reforming and 
restructuring natural gas domestic market, 
allowing private participation in the development 
of gas infrastructure, and creating financial 
incentives that encouraged operators to utilise AG. 
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